Reforming the French intelligence and security system in the post-13/11 Paris attacks era

By: Aliaume Leroy

On Friday 13th of November, France suffered the deadliest terrorist attacks it has ever faced in its history.  The final numbers reflect a substantial toll: the official account reports 130 dead and 352 wounded, including 98 that were in a critical state days after the bombings and shootings. It could have been worse if not for the errors made by the attackers and their lack of training. Were the 13/11 Paris attacks preventable? Were there cracks in the French intelligence system? The arguments can go both ways.

So far, Al Jazeera states that unofficial sources have declared that US and Iraqi intelligence services warned France of an imminent threat to its national security a couple of days before. According to the French newspaper Le Monde, a high-ranking French police officer also stated in early October that France was vulnerable to facing another terrorist strike. Some of the Paris attackers had even been registered and were under the scrutiny of both the DGSI and the DGSE, the French internal and external intelligence services. The French equivalent of the MI6 and CIA, the DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieur or Directorate-General for External Security) is tasked with the protection of French interests and citizens abroad through intelligence gathering and special operations, the latter often performed by the 13^th Parachute Dragoon Regiment of the French army. Formed in 1982, the DGSE reports to the French Ministry of the Interior. Similar to the MI5, the DGSI (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure or General Directorate for Internal Security) is concerned with the domestic security and focuses on counter-terrorism as well as counter-espionage. It was created in 2014 when the French National Police DCRI (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur) was reformed, put under the direct authority of the Ministry of the Interior and renamed DGSI. Despite the fact that both agencies watched some of the 13/11 attackers, France was taken by surprise. This highlights that cracks are present in the French security system, despite the reforms implemented by the government under the “intelligence law” passed following the January 2015 ‘Charlie Hebdo’ shootings. Promulgated in the French National Assembly in March 2015, this new law increased the judicial mandate of French intelligence services as well as the tools they can use to gather information.

Where are the cracks located in the French intelligence system? There are three potential points. The first one is linked to politics: does the government allocate sufficient resources, authority, and mandates to the intelligence services? The second is the logistical or organizational level, and refers to the intelligence agencies’ interactions with each other: do they cooperate or do they compete? The last point concerns the operational level: was there a mistake on behalf of the intelligence officers working on the particular case? Did they fail to properly assess the threat? Although all levels play a role when an intelligence agency fails to prevent an attack, it is nonetheless necessary to assess which level prevailed in order to reform and re-organize the intelligence and security system in a way that maximizes its capacity. Otherwise, reformers risk implementing ill-advised treatments, which will either not cure the problems or make things worse.

In the case of the 13/11 Paris attacks, the political and logistical levels were at the heart of the problem. Since the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ killings, the French intelligence and security apparatuses have been under immense pressure, as the number of threats and individuals to keep under surveillance has increased dramatically; more than 11,000 names are currently listed on the classified FSPRT file (Fichier des Signalés pour la Prévention et la Radicalisation à caractère Terroriste)  according to Le Monde. This document includes individuals suspected of terrorist radicalization. Since it is classified, its criteria for radicalization remain unknown. The post ‘Charlie Hebdo’ reforms called for the need to hire more intelligence and security analysts, and to increase the budget of each agency. However, with these reforms only reaching completion by the end of President Hollande’s term in 2017, the French government’s allocation of personnel and funding to the intelligence services remains stagnant. As a result, the DGSI currently does not have the necessary manpower or funds to monitor all individuals on the FSPRT list.

Furthermore, France possesses overlapping intelligence and security agencies whose interaction resembles the rivalry between the CIA and the FBI before 9/11. Their lack of cooperation, hierarchy and interagency competition impeded the ability of the intelligence services to prevent the 2012 Toulouse and Montauban shootings, perpetrated by Mohammed Merah. Both a French and Algerian national, he killed three French soldiers as well as three children and a teacher in a Jewish school. The poor liaisons between French intelligence agencies also slowed down the investigation in the aftermath of ‘Charlie Hebdo’. To address this issue, Le Monde reports that the French Minister of the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, created a joint operational headquarters for the prevention of terrorism last summer, which regrouped members of all agencies under his direct authority. However, most security officials are skeptical of the new institution. This clearly indicates that the interagency rivalry is enshrined within the culture of the security and intelligence services. Although Cazeneuve’s HQ is a good step towards further cooperation a bottom-up approach might be more efficient.

Indeed, the spearheads of the French intelligence and security agencies are their “on-the-ground” agents. They are doing an excellent job, despite the restrictions outlined above. For instance, Le Monde points to the successful prevention of six attacks since ‘Charlie Hebdo.’ Therefore, enhancing low-level operational cooperation, combined with an increase in resources and staff, is the best way to optimize the French intelligence system. It will create a trickle-up effect whereby high-officials will understand that teamwork and synergy are more efficient tools for fighting terrorism than contention. Unlike in the economic sector, competition harms the effectiveness of intelligence agencies. Sharing information is, on the other hand, the best way to map out terrorist cells and monitor potential threats. A radical increase in intelligence-gathering mandates and techniques will thus be useless if all agencies turn their backs on one another other. Both the French government and high-ranking intelligence officials need to promote further cooperation in future “intelligence law” reforms. This has for example been a major drive in the successful domestic protection of the American soil from the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 period.

Aliaume Leroy is currently conducting an MA in Conflict Security and Development at King’s College London, focusing on asymmetrical warfare, peace-building and state-building, private military companies, and counter-terrorism strategies. He is also a consultant on diamond smuggling for the NGO Global Witness. As a freelance investigative journalist, his works on Swissleaks, gunrunning, drug-trafficking, and money laundering have been published in Le Monde, L’Hebdo and Le Temps. He contributes as well to the citizen journalists’ website Bellingcat. His main regions of interest are the Middle East, Central/Eastern Africa, South/Central Asia (Afghanistan, India, Pakistan) and Latin America. More at http://aliaumeleroy.com/